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Modernization and society: Russian attitudes to identity

N. A. Golovin

St. Petersburg State University,
7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation

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The 1990s crisis, a relatively stable period (2000–2013) and a new period started after the reabsorption of Crimea in 2014, the falling oil prices and Western financial sanctions are the steps for Russia's alienation from Western countries and for growing public interest in the modernization experience of the Asia-Pacific region (APAC) and other countries. The article analyses examples of successful post-War modernization in the world in order to identify and distinguish the most attractive patterns for Russia, not only by economic growth rates, but accounting public attitudes to different countries. The modernization patterns are studied on the basis of global modernization monitoring conducted in the PRC and statistical data. Different modernization models obtained in the frame of historical sociology as methodological basis have been formulated. Reliable empirical data on public opinion is presented in monitoring and analytical research by Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM, Moscow) and Levada Analytical Center (Levada-Center, Moscow). The article proves that the 1990s negative experience resulted in anti-Western mindsets in the society. It was even strengthened in 2000s as a result of tensions. For the same period and subsequent years the attitude of the Russian society to APAC countries (Japan, Korea) has been stable and rather indifferent, except for China. The Chinese modernization based on the Singaporean model, which is interesting for the Russian government, will be supported by the Russian society. The sociological analysis of the Russian public opinion for a quarter of a century combined with modernization achievements and results in different countries and regions has allowed us to assess the orientations for modernization that Russia is facing and to distinguish the most significant and promising pattern.

Keywords: modernization models and patterns, public opinion, the West, the Asia-Pacific region, Russian society, Russia's turn to the East.

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The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic, the ocean of the present, and the Pacific, the ocean of the future.

John Hay, USA-Secretary of State, 1838–1905

Historically, Russia is certainly not Asia; but geographically it is not completely Europe. It is a transitional country, interspersed between two worlds.

*O. V. Kluchevsky, the Russian historian, 1841–1911
(Cit. by: W.S.F. Pickering, Geoffrey Walford «Durkheim's Suicide: A Century of Research and Debate»)*

Introduction

The USSR failure in the Cold War and its further demise became the major political event at the end of the 20th century which had left the question about Russian political position unsettled, the population of the country displeased with backwardness and obsolescence in terms of modernization and a minor role in the world politics.

The sanctions levied against Russia in 2014 and subsequent years have exacerbated the questions on Russia's position in the modern political world, on redefinition of its friends and antagonists (opponents) in the political mindset of the world. The government has reacted to the aggravated political relations with Western countries (Western Europe and the USA) and economic sanctions with the policy of Russia's turn (also known as 'pivot') to the East, associating it with successful modernization in the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

The article studies whether the policy of pivot to the East is supported by the Russian public opinion. Journalists fairly highlight a vague notion of 'turn' metaphor in the mass consciousness [1]. They often reduce this problem of public 'turn' to high intercultural barriers as an obstacle in the business relations of Russian and Far-Eastern economic partners [2], which hinder perspective business results [3]. The turn seems to be elusive [4]. Thus, there is a necessity to define the notion of 'turn' (pivot) scientifically, to develop its sociological meaning. The problem is studied analyzing successful modernization of world countries and grouping them according to modernization models with a brief description of their characteristics.

For the first time a new world order that appeared after the demise of the USSR was widely rethought by an American sociologist, political scientist and philosopher F. Fukuyama in "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992) from the point of modernization. The book proclaims the full victory of liberal democracy and at the same time it does not deny authoritarian powers being able to provide modernization in a country, even more effective than liberal and democratic powers, while the problems of democratization of the society have not been settled yet [5]. Celebrating the victory of liberal democracy, F. Fukuyama ignores numerous conflicts renewed after the named victory in Russia and Eastern Europe countries. The author of the civilization clash concept, Samuel Huntington, in his famous article "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993) sees no point to speak about peace, calm and prosperity. According to Huntington, the prerequisites for intercultural global conflicts are to be found in the conflict between the West and values in other cultures, Islamic Revival ("Islamic Renaissance"), Asia-Pacific region "rise" [6]. The other famous sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein considers that in the 21st century the world capitalism continues to support the poles of wealth and poverty existing since 19th century [7].

Thus, Fukuyama, Huntington, and Wallerstein grasped the victorious tone of politicians and the Western society at the end of the Cold War, and as a result, identity problems in the Russian society, rethinking its new position in the world.

Further, the article describes goals and patterns for modernization which appeared in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. The research is implemented through the monitoring of global modernization applied by professor He Chuanqi in the PRC. The monitoring allows us to define major empirical models (patterns) of modernization. Then, the periods in the post-Soviet history are marked, and for each period the public opinion on national identity, Russia's geopolitical position and modernization patterns are studied. Reliable empirical data, statistics for the period of 1992–2016 provided by Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM, Moscow) and Levada Analytical Center (Levada-Center, Moscow) are used in the article. The applied methodology goes beyond the secondary analysis of sociological survey data or experiments on modeling the historical processes. It addresses the research experience of historical sociology, founded by M. Weber (1864–1920) and W. Sombart (1863–1941). They considered the historical movement of the society, 'turns' of the history as a choice from alternatives revealed in a particular historical situation. The methodological thought was developed in the historical sociology by several generations of followers, who are not enlisted here, but here a reference to N. V. Romanovsky should be made who described the progress of historical sociology [8]. Let us enumerate some examples in the frame of the paradigm: firstly, the research of the Russian society by B. N. Mironov [9]. His book provides methodological basis applied further in the text. Secondly, the research on genesis of modernity conducted by Yu. Plenkov, a historian [10]. Sociologically important conclusions by Plenkov are taken into account as significant methodological provisions.

The third example includes mathematical modeling of historical process (cliodynamics) based on the quantitative data [11]. The interesting methodological branch, though named here, is not further developed in the article, as it does not provide the conceptual historical choice made by the society; let it model widespread mass public processes and tendencies such as social mobility in the theory of P. A. Sorokin (1889–1968), a Russian and American sociologist.

To conclude, the methodological basis of the provided research is historical sociology. Every stage in 'Russia's turn to the East' policy starting from 1992 is studied applying this methodology.

The informational basis is presented by the results of China Modernization Report Outlook directed by He Chuanqi (PRC) [12]; already published research on the Russian attitude to examples (models) of successful modernization in the world from the archive of "The Monitoring of Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes Journal" in the period of 1992–2017; the research of identity changes in Russian society also published in the named Journal, as well as long-term data obtained by Levada Analytical Center (Levada-Center) on the question of Russia's 'Friends-Antagonists' among other countries; other public resources providing economic and political data and enumerated below.

The following questions are answered at the end of the article: What are the most interesting modernization models or patterns? What models are applicable in Russia? Why is it highly likely that the Chinese model will be supported both by the country's government and the Russian society?

The after-War secondary modernization (a shift from industrial to postindustrial society) is accompanied by unprecedented growth of Gross National Product (GNP) and living standards. Even mathematically, according to the compound interest formula, if economic growth rates make 5% per year, in 25 years (the period enough for a new generation to grow) a country's GNP will be multiplied 3 times; if 7% rates are taken, the GNP growth will get bigger 5 times. These ideal and typical examples show drastic social and economic changes in the society: the absence of poverty, satisfaction of all needs, prerequisites for human development. The society cannot be described by mathematical formulas, though, there are real and persuasive examples of intensive modernization in the world which make possible to study the countries with long-lasting economic growth of 5, 7 or even 20% per year (China). They are interesting as patterns for countries and societies entering the phase of secondary modernization. The Russian politicians and community have been attracted by the examples. These countries are summed up in Table 1 marking the features of their modernization, which can be referred to the West as well as the Asia-Pacific region (APAC, the Pacific Rim).

Table 1. Modernization Levels of Countries (the beginning of the XXI century, 2006)

Country	Index of secondary modernization	Index of primary modernization	Integrated modernization index	GNI per capita	HDI ^{2*}	Modernization features
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The West, Europe:						
The USA	109	100	97	44 710	0.950	Market economy, liberal democracy
Germany	93	100	92	36 810	0.940	Market economy, "chancellor" liberal democracy
The UK	91	100	89	40 560	0.942	Market economy with state regulation, "presidential" democracy
The East (APAC):						
Japan	105	100	94	38 630	0.956	Market economy, liberal democracy
The Republic of Korea	95	100	84	17 690	0.928	Market economy, democratization
Singapore	87	100	78	28 730	0.918	Market economy and authoritarian rule
The PRC	40	70	87	2000	0.762	Market economy, the leading role of the CPC
Latin America:						
The Republic of Chile	52	99	56	6810	0.874	Market economy, the military regime, USA oriented
Brazil	49	96	56	4710	0.807	Huge social inequality, USA oriented

For columns from 1 to 6 see: [12]. The integrated index of modernization characterizes the coordination of primary and secondary modernization. Column 7 is the author's expert opinion.

² HDI (the Human Development Index) is a composite index for comparing major features of living standards in different countries; it has been used by the United Nations since 1990.

Table 1 allows us to distinguish some modernization models or patterns: the Western European model combining market economy and liberal democracy; the Singaporean model adopted in China: market oriented, with more or less authoritarian political rule; the Latin American models with high social inequality level. At the beginning of the 20th century market economy is widely understood to have no alternative. There are examples of successful modernization of economy without democratization. This successful example is the Chilean economic modernization under the military regime (military junta). (After the military government has been replaced by the civil government, the junta leaders had been on trail till their deaths.) The Russian society has been widely familiar with the pattern. There are some other popular cases like the Korean one under the rule of General Park Chung-hee (1961–1979) with further democratization [13, p. 539–664]. Countries undergone post-War modernization can be both liberally democratic or not. There is a diversity of rather authoritarian political regimes guaranteeing successful economic modernization of separate countries. The described cases prove the existence of multiple ways for economic and political modernization. The stereotypes of economic growth being connected with society democratization are ruined.

Stages in Formation of Anti-Western Mindsets of the Russian Society

1990s: negative experience of pro-Western orientation. At the beginning of the 1990s, aftermath the unexpected demise of the USSR and the crisis in Soviet economy, the ruling elite of the country and society faced up to a problem of reorganization and new consciousness. For a long time the Soviet elite considered the USSR as a pattern and gave reasons to support the view by the successful industrialization and urbanization — country's shift from rural to modern industrial society — and high development indices in comparison with 1913. But at the end of 1980s the vigour of the arguments was being lost: since 1960s the backwardness from Western Europe and the USA in life standards has become obvious in the regions with unprecedentedly high rates of economic growth and secondary modernization. Besides, the pro-Western orientation had been officially set in the Program by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1961) — 'to catch up with and overtake' the USA and developed countries by 1982 in the volume of industrial production and living standard (communism).

The European pattern has become the most convincing example of modernization after the World War II. It helped to reorient the Soviet society towards the Western consuming standards. In the 1980–1990s the attractiveness was intensified by USSR leader M. S. Gorbachev and his politics involving democratization of the society without a drastic shift to market economy. He was motivated by the idea of 'a united Europe' introduced by President Charles de Gaulle in 1959 in his famous speech 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals'. At that moment it was not supported by the Soviet government; in the recent years of the USSR existence and after the demise it turned to be interesting and influenced the society orientation. The Western rapprochement seemed to have no alternative.

The 1991 coup d'état and the succeeded USSR demise, the resignation of USSR President allowed a new government of the RF to apply 'shock therapy' — implementing market economy since 2 January 1992. The year 1992 laid the foundation for multidimensional and crisis transformations in the state and society for the all 1990s. On this basis, firstly, the relations between Russia and the West have been friendly. '...In the USA and

especially in Europe of that years everything Russian and Soviet was in fashion based on gratitude to M. Gorbachev for German unification, hopes on decisive B. Yeltsin and quick reforms [14, p. 41–42].’ In its turn the Russian society had the growing interest for the developed countries, their social order and sources of high living standards. The song titled ‘American boy, I will fly with you’ has become popular; even President of the RF was dancing to it [15, p. 14].

The relations with the West have always been important for the society. During the State Duma elections in 1993 17 % of voters noted the importance of the Party position on this question. A contradictory tendency to restore the country’s position as the superpower and the relations with the West was combined in the public opinion (see table 2).

Table 2. Sovereign Consciousness and Relation with the West, Public Opinion of the RF Citizens in 1994, Proportion of Respondents in % [16, p. 20]

Indices	Proportion
Relations to the superpower role	
1) Russia should aim at it	66
2) Russia should not aim at it	32
The relation between Russia and the West	
1) will be always built on mistrust	37
2) can be really friendly	60

After several years of the ‘shock therapy’ in the economy, the US and Western orientations had become less important counting the social problems. During the 1996 presidential elections a question was included in the survey: ‘What will be the most important factor when you choose a candidate for the post of President of the RF to vote for?’ Only 2 % (the first variant) of respondents and 5 % (the second and third variants, the survey on 30 January, 1996) pointed out the candidate’s view on the relations with the West. Further difficulties of the economic reforms led to remarkable weakening in pro-Western society orientations. Almost full disappointment in populist programs of a quick shift to market economy (‘500 days’ and others), society disorientation because of excessive pluralism in the political process when a right to participate in the elections was given to almost 100 political parties and public organizations in the frame of Russian liberal democracy³. The significant role in ‘cooling’ the affinities towards the West was performed by the European support of Chechen separatism on the Russian Caucasus, which was perceived by the society as the interference into the RF domestic policy.

³ The disorientation is forced by the Russian political sophistry. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is a national and patriotic party using liberal and democratic terms in its title, what makes liberal democrats search for new names for their parties, sometimes too metaphorical ones (The Russian United Democratic Party “Yabloko”, The Union of Right Forces). Note: the word ‘yabloko’ is translated into English as ‘an apple’. Historically, the party got its name not in honor of the fruit but as an acronym taken from family names of the founders: Yavlinsky, Boldyrev, Lukin — YaBLoko.

A sudden and painful historical trauma for the society was NATO military activities in former Yugoslavia (1999) without the UN authorization, combined with several Eastern European countries, former satellite states of the USSR, becoming the members of the Organization. Mistrust to the EU was born, accompanied by a deceitful impression on Russia as the USSR agreement to reunite Germany was obtained only with the condition that NATO would not expand to the East. Simultaneously, the interest to China, demonstrating the long-lasting and remarkable economic growth, was enhanced. For the Russian society China seemed to be a familiar socialist country reformed without economic catastrophes and not according to the Western pattern. The constant interest to successful economic modernization in other Far Eastern countries has been created at this point: the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, to less extent, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Alienation from pro-Western orientations in the Russian society was forced by the disappointment from not implemented populist programs promising a quick shift to market economy, people hardships and tiredness from life in the 1990s crisis society, accompanied by prolonged political instability: five Prime Ministers resigned during 1998–1999.

2000s: transformation of the political identity in the Russian society. The RF economic growth quickly reached 5–7% and became almost the same as for the East Asian 'tigers' (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea) in the period from 1960s to the first half of 1990s. It created optimism and hope for successful modernization in the country, although the economic growth was obviously achieved by high world prices on oil, the RF budget resembled the budget of oil producers in the Middle East, the example was generally agreed not to be acceptable for Russia.

The optimism was enhanced by the middle class creation. If in the 1990s, according to different research data, more than a half of all families was poor and needy (all money and resources were spent on food and primary goods, no savings) [17, p. 19], the middle class took a remarkable proportion in the population, the mid 2000s. This class with its integration into the consumer society is appreciated by the ruling power for being politically loyal. Its life expectations include harmonized market relations in the economy, material wealth, democratization and civil society [18; 19]. Since the year 2000 the proportion of respondents identifying themselves with the middle class has been growing and reached 50% in 2008. 'A considerable group of citizens has been formed in the Russian society; these people consciously affiliate themselves with the middle class on the assumption of the middle class place and role in the contemporary society' [20, p. 13]. In the research by the Institute of Sociology, the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISRAS), it is noted that such a large proportion has been obtained on the basis of respondents self-esteem, thus, it makes the results subjective, and the Western welfare society for 'two-thirds' of the population has not been created yet, the professional structure for the middle class has not built [21, p. 61].

The rise of living standards for the population, post-Soviet young people starting their public life, the falling proportion of people grown up in the Soviet period have changed the political identification in the Russian society and the sovereignty consciousness. The official Soviet feeling of the superiority over other public systems has almost disappeared. 'There is no proud for Russia, as well as no arrogance, national and ethnic or political complacency...' 42% of the population believe in Russia 'being better than the majority of other countries' that makes the 13th place out of 22 researched countries. Japan, the

USA, New Zealand and Canada (84–77 %) have been ranked at the top of the list; minor European countries with high living standards and developed national culture are placed lower [22, p. 42].

Meanwhile, the Russian cultural identity is evolving. Rrough data on its are provided in table 3.

Table 3. Russia is the closest on culture to what countries of? [23, p.40–44]

	Years	Point											
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
West: USA, Ger- many, France	1998	9,3	8,1	14,9	17	10,3	23,6	4,2	5,1	4,1	1,5	1,9	East: China, Japan, India
	2004	8	8	16,5	16,1	10,1	21,4	4,7	4,9	4,1	1	1,6	
	2007	12,2	10,9	18,6	12,7	9,8	17,3	4,8	2,9	3,7	2,1	2,1	
Identity: Russia is the West					Eurasian identity			East (Asian) essence of Russia					

Numerals in each of the square for a 11-mark scale — a share of respondents in the % which have noted the square in the answer from the total number of respondents.

In extremely left square a share of the respondents considering that Russia is the West. In far-right square a share of the respondents emphasizing “East” or “Asian” essence of Russia. The center of a scale expresses the “Eurasian nature” of Russia (sections 5-7). The getting stronger feeling of independence, self-confidence, is noted a tendency to separate from the West. However indicators, oddly enough, have moved in an opposite direction. The share of the considering that Russia’s culture stands much closer to the USA, England, France, than to India or China, has increased since 2004 by 6%.

The cultural identity change and their ambivalence make the political elite obtain greater freedom in choice of priorities for foreign policy and modernization ways. ‘It’s highly likely a chosen policy to be rather pragmatic, depending on particular activities taken by the West in relations to Russia,’ one of Moscow sociologists says [24, p. 52]. Obviously, numerous negative evaluations of the Russian domestic policy given by European leaders, curtailing cooperation in many spheres in the 2000s, have had a negative impact on the attitudes of population towards Western countries. Since the beginning of the 2000s the attitude to Europe in the society has become ambivalent (see table 4).

We should note that joining the EU has never been a practical idea for Russia. According to media the country’s government would have been satisfied with a visa-free access to the EU, the situation would have responded to the expectations of the middle class. Since 2003 there has been a working group of the RF and EU on the visa-free access to be introduced starting from the year 2007, but the goal has not been achieved [25]. Great efforts, including a draft agreement on the visa-free access, submitted by the Russian party to the EU, failed in 2012, the negotiations were suspended in 2014.

Symbolically, among the developed countries the mentioned access was granted to Russia by the Republic of Korea in 2014, the case of the EU visa-free regime is an example of alienation. At the informal meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club President V. V. Putin noted with disappointment: ‘We have made no progress towards intro-

Table 4. Degree of Consent with Contradictory Judgments about Russian and European Relations. 2001 [24, p. 51–52]

Paired Judgments	Proportion, %
The first pair:	
1) Russia is a part of Europe. In the XX century it has influenced greatly on the destiny of European states and peoples, in the XXI century it will be closely connected with this particular world region.	65
2) Russia is not a European country in its full sense. It's an absolutely special Eurasian civilization, in the future its center will be relocated to the East.	35
The second pair:	
1) The developed European countries are interested in Russia overcoming crisis, as Europe is a common place for Russia too.	43
2) Strengthening of Russia makes a threat for European countries, that is why these countries are not interested in an actual rise of Russia.	57
The third pair:	
1) Russia should strive to join the European community.	53
2) Russia is not obliged, or even it need not join the United Europe.	47

ducing visa-free travel. Really, this is just laughable. Europe has visa-free travel with some Latin American countries. Is the crime situation there really any better than in Russia? Of course not. This is all quite absurd, you understand. I am at a loss really to understand our colleagues' motivations here. These are things that are holding back rapprochement between Russia and the EU, and this is not a good situation' [26]. It should be added that the case of visa-free travel promotes the idea of retargeting from the West to the Asia-Pacific region, supported by the population.

The Newest Tendencies. After the reabsorption of Crimea (18.03.2014), a new period was marked in the relations between the RF and the Western countries. The period is connected with the Ukrainian conflict, NATO military activities near the Russian state borders, economic restrictions or sanctions levied by Western countries, the exclusion of the RF from G8. At the same period oil prices have fallen, economic growth rates have slowed down (2014–2016). The growing tensions in relations with the West and the examples of successful modernization in the Asia-Pacific region may appear attractive for the society. The political leaders promote relations with the member-states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the BRICS, and many integrative organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.

A significant contribution to political retargeting of Russia to the East is made by the lack of political ideology in the EU, searches for a common European identity that have resulted in nothing (Brexit is an example, 23.06.2016).

The civil identity in European countries has accumulated many problems. In Europe people critically assess their history and feel themselves guilty for it. European politicians constantly apologize for the Crusades, the World War I and II, Nazism (that is correct!), colonialism (that is disputable), for the fact that 500 years ago while discovering America Europeans ruined the harmony between Native Americans and the

nature and colonized it with participation of the Catholic Church, for crimes targeted against Native Americans [27]. European migrant crisis in 2015–2017 shows that Western liberal democracy is incapable of taking quick and correct anti-crisis decisions in economy and politics, and a renewal is required. There are no doubts in the success of the chosen methods, but the renewal has not been completed yet. The European pattern is becoming less attractive in the Russian public opinion; alternative ways of development are winning the attention.

Anti-Western Approach and New Patterns for Modernization

Ordinary and scientific notions of the West. In Russian public opinion the West is understood as the USA, NATO, Western business community, mass culture (Westernization) and even the whole world community. This notion does not fully stay within the science criteria as it has a dual nature: on one hand, the progressive development of the world according to the Western model is acknowledged; on the other hand, it is ‘the source of erodible damage caused to our society in the form of hucksterism, businesses’ [28, p.24]. This notion of the West is not clear and metaphorical.

The modern scientific notion of the West has resulted from the genesis of the term. Before the WWII the notion did not exist at all. Europe was divided into Central, Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern. In the 19th century the core of the ‘world-system’ (I. Wallerstein) was created resembling the present G20 — an aggregate of countries that provide 70–80 % of the Gross World Product (the UK, Germany, China, the Republic of Korea, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the USA, Japan and some others, including the RF). In the 19th century the mentioned European countries significantly raised the welfare of their population and provided access to the blessings of civilization even with rather modest economic growth rates. Europeans of that period have experienced a feeling of superiority over the rest of the world, other cultures.

After the WWII Eastern Europe was sovietized, the left 17 countries in Europe (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and etc.), Japan, Australia and others were supported to recover their economies according to the Marshall⁴ Plan, or the European Recovery Program. Not widely known, the Plan appeared to provide the support in exchange of establishing cooperation and economic unity between member-states; it regarded ‘the elimination of all trade barriers’ in the ‘Treaty on European Economic Co-operation’ which was signed on 15–16.04.1948 at the meeting of the Marshall Plan countries [29]. A course for economic globalization was set and it has been implemented till now (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, later the World Trade Organization established in 1995).

Many Marshall Plan countries in Europe and Japan have demonstrated unexampled economic growth of 5, or even 10 % per year for several decades. Already in the 1970s the Plan provided a shift to a new qualitative economy and welfare of population. In these countries under the pressure of Allies (Germany) or existing traditions (France, Italy) the liberal democracy was accepted, in the best way demonstrating the interests of the public diversity.

⁴ George Catlett Marshall, 1880–1959, the 50th United States Secretary of State, in office 1947–1949, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The overall success of the Marshall Plan, mentioned events and processes created the political and economic core of a modern West, not fully coinciding with the territory of Europe and Asia-Pacific region. Western countries can be determined as a combination of developed market economy, liberal democracy and developed social policy. They form an aggregate of countries which economies have recovered after the WWII according to the Marshall Plan under the US supervision. In this political and economic sense of the West some other countries promoting the economic liberalism policy (eliminating trade or other barriers and restricting economic protectionism) can be added to the list. The Far Eastern 'tigers' (Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) are to be named here, having achieved the high growth rates for several decades. Then, 'dragons' joined the economic globalization (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines), also having demonstrated high growth rates. Since the 1970s the scientific notion has been converted into a political and economic notion, not a regional and political one. Counting this notion shift, the critical assessment of the Russian society orientations can be given on the examples of successful modernization considering the changing attitude in the Russian society towards the West and East in general.

Levada-Center observational studies show that Russian attitude to different countries has changed differently during a relatively stable period in economy. In table 5 we would like to compare the index, applying it to the countries, which were previously used in the present article to distinguish the modernization models, table 1.

Table 5. Monitoring Attitudes of Russians to Foreign Countries from 'Russia's Friends-Antagonists' Position during a Relatively Stable Period (2006–2017) [30]

Russia's Friends

Countries	2006	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
The West											
The USA	5	6	2	7	5	2	4	<1	1	—	2
Germany	22	24	17	24	20	17	14	4	2	2	2
The East											
China	24	19	18	16	18	16	20	40	43	34	39
Japan	6	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	2	5	4
North Korea	3	2	1	2	4	1	1	3	3	3	3
South Korea	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	2
No friends	13	10	13	11	11	17	15	13	11	14	12
Find it difficult to answer	15	18	14	12	15	18	14	16	14	11	14

Russia's Antagonists

Countries	2006	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
The West											
The USA	37	35	45	26	33	35	38	69	73	72	69
Germany	2	2	3	1	4	3	3	18	19	19	24
The UK	5	3	8	6	8	7	9	18	21	18	15
The East											
Japan	4	3	3	3	9	6	7	5	6	5	6
China	—	3	3	4	4	4	5	1	<1	1	2
North Korea	<1	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	1	2
No opponents	4	2	3	4	14	7	7	3	3	5	3
Find it difficult to answer	19	17	15	17	1	21	24	17	14	10	11

To answer the question a respondent was given a card enumerating countries. Variants are possible; answers are ranged against the year 2017.

Table 5 shows that Western countries have been understood as antagonists since 2014, if they have never got many points on 'friends' scale. The year 2014 is marked by high rates of antagonistic attitude. The remarkable observation is Germany's shift from 'friends' to 'antagonists' in the public opinion. At the same time, the Russian society almost has not changed its attitude to Japan and South Korea, the representatives of Eastern modernization, for a couple of decades. This attitude is not significant and less interesting for the Russian society; it is proved by the public opinion polls on representation carried out by VCIOM for the Republic of Korea (as one of the examples) in 2016–2017 [31].

The most important change is the stable positive attitude to China strengthened after 2014. Experts on Eastern studies note certain problems in business and intercultural relations [32], even taking this into account, the model of predominating China is worth primary sociological studying as a pattern for the Russian society.

The Western modernization model means shifting from traditional society to modernity accompanied by high living standards. Its major political advantage is liberal democracy which, according to an American philosopher, sociologist and political scientist Francis Fukuyama, is deprived of 'fundamental internal contradictions' and 'the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved upon' [5].

Among all Western countries the USA are attractive as the first and the most technological and innovative economy in the world with high growth rates and the highest income per capita (see table 1). On these indices the USA come adrift Europe. The ideas introduced by European and American classics of liberalism and democracy have been

realized in the American society. The elections are not doubted to be democratic. Regardless existing alienation, at 2009 Seliger Youth Education Forum President of the RF said that the USA had been an example of social order in many aspects: 'I will give you the example of another multi-ethnic nation that has successfully dealt with this problem: the United States of America. They also have their fair share of problems, but they were able to create the framework of an American nationality, which was achieved through very difficult work that lasted for many decades' [33].

However, the United States of America have inherited a Russian opponent role in the world politics from the bipolar world and continue to play it in the 21st century, enforced after 2014. Russian sociological surveys reveal that the country is perceived as an antagonist rather than an ally. Nevertheless, in the 21st century the USA are unable to determine the world politics solely; in the Russian society there is a growing necessity to boost the country's role in the world. In Europe and other countries there are examples of political independence and prosperity: the UK, Sweden, Switzerland, China, none of these countries has been manipulated by the USA, or any other political agents in the world politics. Although, small countries like Sweden and Switzerland have never presented an ideal example for the Russian society because of their minor roles in the world economy and politics. The Chinese model has been gaining its popularity.

The Chinese model. After the WWII the PRC under Máo Zédōng (毛泽东, 1893–1976), the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, restored its status as the world superpower and since 1971 together with the USA they have jointly opposed the Soviet hegemony in the world. Though, Tiananmen Square protests (六四事件) on 4.06.1989 revealed obvious discrepancies in the views of the Chinese and American ruling parties on democracy and democratization, the relations have been alienated for decades [34].

After several failed economic projects (The Great Leap Forward, 1958–1960) and dead-end efforts in modernization at the end of the XX century the PRC has applied the Singaporean model introduced by Prime Minister Lǐ Guāngyào (李光耀, 1923–2015), where market economy is combined with an authoritarian political regime and harsh discipline for people in everyday life. (Singapore was demonstrating growth rates of 10 % a year since the 1960s till 2010s.) The Singaporean and Chinese examples have disavowed the myth about economic growth possible only with liberal democracy. China is a symbol of the biggest country combining rapidly growing market, the leading role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) which had rejected Marxist ideology, but provided succession of power and original cultural traditions. That makes the Chinese modernization model attractive.

Summing up the world modernization experience Francis Fukuyama has concluded an empirical condition of success: growth rates must comprise 6–7 % per year for a period of at least 20 years, and GDP per capita equals \$2000 and more. He thinks that European and Asian countries 'have democratized (or are in the process of doing so) in strict proportion of their degree of development' [5, p. 112]. However, for countries in transition from the primary to secondary modernization he considers 'market-oriented authoritarianism' being a more suitable pattern. The regime is better than liberal democracy as it is more consistently 'able to follow truly liberal economic policies undistorted by redistributive goals that constrain growth' [5, p. 124]. Thus, Fukuyama theoretically described the Chinese model and covered the most important alternatives for modernization.

Referring to the Russian modernization it should be noted that being under crisis since 2014 the RF government has clearly followed economic policy of liberal market,

requiring openness to the world. For example, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation said in 2016: '...There is no alternative to the World Trade Organization at the moment... These particular ideas guided our application to the WTO system — to be an integral part of the modern economic world order... It required significant reductions in tariffs, but that is the fee every country pays to apply... It took a long period of time., if I'm not mistaken, almost 15 years. (It took less time for China.) There were different reasons to reject our application' [35].

The attractiveness of the Chinese model is determined not alone by its long-lasting economic growth, but the Communist Party of China has no tendency for 'one-party rule to degenerate over time' that Fukuyama is speaking about. On the contrary, having left the Marxist ideology aside, the Chinese Communist Party has given some space for entrepreneurs and is acting to gain public welfare, has its independent foreign policy. Unlike the USA and European countries, neither the PRC is interfering with the domestic policy of the RF (nor Asia-Pacific countries do), it does not express unjust criticism about human rights received by Russia from Western governments. Non-interference by the PRC and APA countries in the RF domestic policy is strengthening their attractiveness as a modernization pattern in the Russian society.

Not Attractive Patterns. A quarter of a century after the economic and political reforms started, Russia has not significantly advanced in the economic modernization. The flow of petrodollars in 2000–2014 allowed the 1990s crisis outcomes to be smoothed. The country has paid out the foreign debt and has become a lender itself. It was invited to join the G8 (at the Denver summit in 1997, Russia was admitted to finish its historical transformation into a democratic state with market economy). Russia has also joined the Group of Twenty (major advanced and emerging economies; G20). Even with the constant and sufficient petrodollars flow the government understood the side risks. Prime Minister of the Russian Federation said in 2011: 'One should be careful about things that easy come. Easy come, easy go' [36].

The petrodollars flow allowed social problems to be solved and living standards to become comparable with Western Europe. For example: the Persian Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, that is simultaneously demonstrating conservatism in culture (traditional clothes, law traditions, country's name inherited from the ruling dynasties and etc.). This example proves that the success of modernization is provided neither by oil, nor by constant foreign aid (which is usually stolen), on the contrary, it is provided by a single impulse like the Marshall Plan and other economic policy measures ensuring the growth of 7–10% a year as in the Republic of Korea for the period of 1960s–1990s with further democratization [23, p. 546]. The Russian situation of 'double shock' (the falling oil prices and Western restrictions since 2014) can be a similar incentive for modernization.

These conditions are taken into account. 'We have to transform our economic model. In fact, for the first time in recent 15 years (or even more) we can concentrate on our economy diversification, be engaged in creation of its normal structure and what is now called 'import replacement', not paying attention to trends in oil indexes. The strategy bears fruits. Not so fast, but it gives results,' Prime Minister of the Russian Federation stated [35]. His words prove the refusal to understand the world modernization simplistically and shift expectations of its results for two or three decades, while keeping high growth rates in economy and democratization. It's only possible if the world experience is considered.

Outcomes. The Russian government and society are closely tracking the successful examples of development in the world and comparing them, and the Asia-Pacific region cases are brought into focus. It does not presuppose immediate turn to the East, but interest to globalization and progressive political democratization, which in the RF case is comparable with the APAC level of democracy, rather than European ideals of liberal democracy which is urgently requiring innovations.

Among the most important examples of economic and political modernization in the XX century the Russian society is attracted by some of them:

- Western Europe with great economic and social achievements (Germany, France, Italy), liberal democracy in the EU, though numerous problems have appeared by the 21st century. Small European countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands) are well disposed by the public opinion but not regarded as patterns because of their minor roles in the world economy and politics;
- the American example is less appealing. The USA as a country with market economy and minimal governmental control are not suitable for the Russian situation, but the innovative character is an indisputably magnetic advantage of the economy. From a political point of view, American liberal democracy as well as European one lost its attractiveness for Russia in the 1990s because of unworthy criticism of Russian domestic policy and accumulated problems within the liberal democratic pattern itself;
- the Asia-Pacific countries as an aggregate of countries with high economic rates became magnetic at the beginning of the 21st century, as they are searching for the correct balance between market and democracy while preserving cultural origins. The Chinese pattern stands out, mixing economic growth and political stability, international influence and distinctiveness;
- Arabic countries are to be named among unattractive examples, where modernization is based on oil selling, represent a risky or hazardous pattern. The Chilean modernization under General Pinochet (1973–1990) is not attractive for Russians having been connected with the military regime.

In the middle of 2010s the political elites and Russian society completed the transition to a conservative world view: apart from the idea of ‘market Renaissance’ which our ruling parties have constantly followed since 1990s, Russian authorities stated that it would support conservative values: the strong state based on national and cultural traditions. Despite alienation from the West in the Russian society and ‘turn to the East’, the mentioned policy and value orientation promote integration into the world community as the modern world has comprised its value uniformity in conservatism.

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Author's information:

Nikolay A. Golovin — Doctor of Social Sciences, Professor; Nikolay.Golovin@mail.ru

Модернизация и общество: отношение россиян к идентичности

Н. А. Головин

Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9

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Время кризисных 1990-х годов, период относительной стабилизации (2000–2013) и новый период истории, начавшийся в 2014 г. с возвращения Крыма, падения цен на нефть и финансовых санкций Запада, являются шагами дистанцирования России от стран Запада и роста интереса общества к опыту модернизации стран Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона (АТР), других стран мира. В статье анализируются примеры успешной послевоенной модернизации в странах мира, чтобы определить наиболее привлекательную из них для России не только с точки зрения темпов экономического роста,

но и с учетом отношения населения к разным странам. Изучение примеров модернизации выполнено с учетом данных мониторинга модернизации в мире, проводимом в Китае, и с использованием статистических данных. Они сформулированы в качестве различных моделей модернизации, полученных в рамках исторической социологии как методологической основы. Эмпирические данные о российском общественном мнении взяты из мониторинговых и аналитических исследований Всероссийского центра изучения общественного мнения (ВЦИОМ, Москва) и Левада-Центра (Москва). Доказано, что в результате негативного опыта 1990-х годов сформировалась антизападная установка общества. В 2000-е годы в связи с ростом напряженности она окрепла. За этот период и далее отношение российского общества к странам Азиатско-Тихоокеанского региона (Япония, Корея) остается стабильным и довольно незаинтересованным, за исключением Китая. Успешная модернизация Китая по сингапурской модели, к которой проявляет интерес российское руководство, найдет поддержку российского общества. Социологический анализ российского общественного мнения за четверть века с учетом результатов модернизации в других странах и регионах мира позволил дать актуальную оценку ориентиров российской модернизации, определить наиболее значимый из них.

Ключевые слова: модели модернизации, общественное мнение, Запад, Азиатско-Тихоокеанский регион, российское общество, поворот России на Восток.

Контактная информация:

Головин Николай Александрович — д-р социол. наук, проф.; Nikolay.Golovin@mail.ru