Cultural patterns of corrupt decision-making in Russian organizations
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu12.2020.403Abstract
The persistence of corruption in Russia is seen in path-dependent political structures on the one hand, while, on the other hand, concrete corruption-promoting mechanisms can be theoretically described at the level of the actor. The former approach lacks a general explanation of corruption, while the latter lacks the immanent possibility of embedding corrupt practices in specific cultural patterns. Recent approaches in organizational research promise a fruitful connection of both via the idea of organizational corruption, which explains corruption as a normalization process in an organizational context. The present article aims at extending this
approach by an analytical model of decision-making in organizations based on a neo-institutional framework. Decision-making situations will be constructed in the activity structure of organizations as the tension between formal-legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the organization as set out in the formal structure. Depending on whether decisions are oriented in accordance or or against legal requirements and the legitimate goals of the organization, a compliant decision, individual corruption, organizational corruption or whistle blowing becomes more likely. Thus, the link between different cultural concepts in Russia and corruption are systematically highlighted and integrated into the present model. It is shown that culturalhistorical patterns cannot be generalized to Russia, but often only promote corruption when specifically embedded in organizations.
Keywords:
organizational corruption, neo-institutional approach, analytical framework, corrupt decisions, cultural patterns
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
References
References
Auzan A., Kruchkova P. Administrative barriers in economics: Issues of deregulation. Voprosy Economiki, 2001, vol. 5, pp. 73–88. (In Russian)
Gaspar V., Hagan S. Corruption: Costs and Mititgating Strategies. IMF Staff Discussion Note, 2016.
Leys C. What is the Problem about Corruption? Heidenheimer A., Johnston M. (eds) Political Corruption, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick. London, 2009, pp. 59–76.
DiTella R., Schargrodsky E. The Role of Wages and Auditing During a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires. Journal of Law and Economics, 2003, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 269–292.
Fischer C. Corruption in Healthcare: A Problem in Germany, too. Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 2014, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 110–117.
Welsch H. Corruption, Growth, and the Environment: A Cross-Country Analysis, 2003. Discussion Paper No. 357, DIW Berlin.
Buckley N. Corruption and Power in Russia. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2018.
Kazyrytski L. Fighting Corruption in Russia: Its Characteristics and Purpose. Social & Legal Studies, 2020, vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 421–443.
Transparency International (2019) Corruption-Perception-Index 2019. Available at: https://www.transparency.de/cpi/cpi-2019/cpi-2019-tabellarische-rangliste/ (accessed: 23.09.2020).
Dimant E. The Antecedents and Effects of Corruption — A Reassessment of Current (Empirical) Findings, 2014. MPRA Paper No. 60947.
Schulze G. G., Zakharov N. Corruption in Russia — Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature. CESifo Working Paper, 2018, no. 6864, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich.
McKenzie R. B., Tullock G. Homo Oeconomicus. Ökonomische Dimensionen des Alltags. Frankfurt/Main, Campus, 1984.
Luhmann N. Funktionen und Folgen formaler Organisation, Bd. 20. Berlin, Duncker & Humbolt, 1964.
Klinkhammer J. On the Dark Side of the Code: Organizational Challenges to an Effective Anticorruption Strategy. Crime, Law and Social Change, 2013, no. 60, pp. 191–208.
Pohlmann M. C., Höly K., Klinkhammer J. Personal Gain or Organizational Benefits? How to Explain Active Corruption. German Law Journal, 2016, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 73–99.
Fleck C., Kuzmics H. Korruption. Zur Soziologie nicht immer abweichenden Verhaltens. Athenäum, Königstein/Ts., 1985.
Campos J. E., Pradhan S. The Many Faces of Corruption. Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level. Washington, D.C., The World Bank, 2007.
Diekmann A., Voss T. Die Theorie des rationalen Handelns. Stand und Perspektiven. Diekmann A., Voss T. (eds) Rational-Choice-Theorie in den Sozialwissenschaften. Anwendungen und Probleme. Munich, Oldenbourg, 2004, pp. 13–32.
Becker G. S. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 1968, vol. 76, no. 2, pp. 169–217.
Festinger L. Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz. Bern, Huber, 1978.
Beckmann J. Kognitive Dissonanz. Eine handlungstheoretische Perspektive. Berlin, Springer, 1984.
Cohen A. K. Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York, Free Press, 1955.
Merton R. K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Toward the Codification of Theory and Research. Glencoe, IL, Free Press, 1949.
Meier B.-D. Kriminologie (5th ed.). Munich, C. H. Beck, 2006.
Messner S. F., Rosenfeld R. Institutional Anomie Theory: A Macro-sociological Explanation of Crime. Krohn M., Lizotte A. and Hall G. (eds) Handbook on Crime and Deviance. New York, Springer, 2009, pp. 209–224.
Hermann D. Werte und Kriminalität. Konzeption einer allgemeinen Kriminalitätstheorie. Wiesbaden, Westdeutscher Verlag, 2013.
Levin M., Satarov G. Corruption and institutions in Russia. European Journal of Political Economy, 2000, vol. 16, pp. 113–132.
Avtonomov V. Balancing State, Market and Social Justice: Russian Experiences and Lessons to Learn. Journal of Business Ethics, 2006, vol. 66, pp. 3–9.
Cheloukhine S., King J. Corruption Networks as a Sphere of Investment Activities in Modern Russia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2007, vol. 40, pp. 107–122.
Ledeneva A. V. Russia’s Practical Norms and Informal Governance: The Origins of Endemic Corruption. Social Research, 2013, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 1135–1162.
Anand V., Ashforth B. E., Mahendra J. Business as Usual: The Acceptance and Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations. The Academy of Management Executive, 2004, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 9–23.
Ashforth B. E., Anand V. The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations. Kramer R. M., Staw B. M. (eds) Research in organizational Behavior, Bd. 25. New York, Elsevier Ltd., 2003, pp. 1–52.
Aguilera R. V., Vadera A. K. The Dark Side of Authority. Antecedents, Mechanisms, and Outcomes of Organizational Corruption. Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, vol. 77, pp. 431–449.
Campbell J.-L., Göritz A. Culture Corrupts! A Qualitative Study of Organizational Culture in Corrupt Organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 2014, vol. 120, pp. 291–311.
Rabl T., Kühlmann T. M. Understanding Corruption in Organizations: Development and Empirical Assessment of an Action Model. Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 477–495.
Staffhorst C. Wertkonflikte in Unternehmen. Eine erweiterte organisationstheoretische Analyse von Korruption. Wiesbaden, VS-Verlag, 2010.
Venard B., Hanafi M. Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries. Journal of Business Ethics, 2008, vol. 81, pp. 481–498.
Ashforth B. E., Gioia D. A., Robinson S. L., Trevino L. K. Re-viewing Organizational Corruption. The Academy of Management Review, 2008, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 670–684.
Pinto J., Leana C. R., Pil F. K. Corrupt Organizations or Organizations of Corrupt Individuals? Two Types of Organization-level Corruption. Academy of Management Review, 2008, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 685–709.
Pohlmann M. C., Höly K. Manipulation in der Transplantationsmedizin. Ein Fall von organisationaler Devianz?, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 2017, vol. 69, pp. 181–207.
Berger P. L., Luckmann T. The social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. London, Penguin Press, 1966.
Meyer J., Rowan B. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 1977, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 340–363.
Jepperson R. L. Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism. DiMaggio P. J., Powell W. W. (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1991, pp. 143–163.
DiMaggio P. J., Powell W. W. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 1983, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 147–160.
Tacke V. Rationalität im Neo-Institutionalismus. Vom exakten Kalkül zum Mythos. Senge K., Hellmann K.-U. (eds) Einführung in den Neo-Institutionalismus. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2006, pp. 89–101.
McAdam D., Scott W. Organizations and Movements. Davis G., McAdam D., Scott W., Zald M. (eds) Social Movements and Organization Theory. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 4–40.
Scott W. R. Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, Sage, 1995.
Zucker L. G. The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence. American Sociological Review, 1977, vol. 42, no. 5, pp. 726–743.
Venard B. Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption: An Empirical Research in Russia. Journal of Business Ethics, 2009, vol. 89, pp. 59–76.
Suhara M. Corruption in Russia: A Historical Perspective. Hayashi T. (ed.) Democracy and Market Economics in Central and Eastern Europe: Are New Institutions being Consolidated? Sapporo, Hokkaido University, 2004, pp. 383–403.
Ledeneva A. V. Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Ledeneva A. V. Unwritten Rules. How Russia Really Works. Tolkachi of the New Russian Economy. London, Centre for European Reform, 2001.
Kosals L. Yu. The business climate in the clan economic system. Istoriia novoi Rossii. Ocherki, interviu. In 3 vol. Vol. 1. St. Petersburg: Norma Publ., 2011, pp. 405–448. (In Russian)
Berliner J. S. Factory and Manager in the USSR. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957.
Khlevniuk O. V. Tolkachi: Parallel Boosters of the Stalinist Economic System (1930s-1950s). Cahiers du monde russe, 2018, vol. 59, no 2, pp. 233–254.
Liuhto K. The Transformation of the Soviet Enterprise and its Management: A Literature Review, 1999, Working Paper no. 146, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
Ledeneva A. V. From Russia with “Blat”: Can Informal Networks Help Modernize Russia? Social Research, 2009, vol. 76, no. 1, pp. 257–288.
Libman A., Obydenkova A. Communism or Communists? Soviet Legacies and Corruption in Transition Economies. Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, pp. 101–103.
Downloads
Published
2021-01-14
How to Cite
Fürstenberg, A. . (2021). Cultural patterns of corrupt decision-making in Russian organizations. Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Sociology, 13(4), 393–406. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu12.2020.403
Issue
Section
Social Problems of the Russian Society
License
Articles of "Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Sociology" are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
